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CLAIMS AS POINTERS: THE STATUTORY
APPROACH TO CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Joseph Mueller*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, recognizing the
dissonance in the case law on claim construction, has taken en banc the case of
Phillips v. AWH Corp.' The en banc order in Phillips suggests that the Federal
Circuit intends to address the flashpoint for conflict in the case law on claim
construction: the relative priority of the possible sources for claim meaning, and
in particular the relative priority of the patent's written description as against
extrinsic sources such as dictionaries.2
Those Federal Circuit cases that have attempted to probe this important
question have usually focused on earlier decisions issued by the Federal Circuit
and other courts. Two axioms run through these cases: first, claims must be read
in light of the specification, and second, it is improper to import limitations from
the specification into the claims,' These two axioms regularly conflict, as defining
a claim in light of the specification (as urged by the first axiom) can be substan-
tively identical to importing a limitation from the specification (as prohibited by
the second axiom). Attempts at reconciling these twin axioms have not
succeeded, as shown by the decision to take Phillps en banc.
While considerable attention has been paid to the case law and its conflicting
axioms, little attention has been given to the statutory text itself, which ironically
* Associate at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dort LLP, adjunct professor of law at Boston
College Law School, and former law clerk to judge Patti B. Saris of the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts and to judge Paul R. Michel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. The views expressed in this Essay are the author's own.
1 376 F.3d 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("This court has determined to
hear this case en banc to resolve issues concerning the construction of patent claims.").
2 See id. at 1383 ("Is the public notice function of patent claims better served by referencing
primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a claim term
or by looking primarily to the patentee's use of the term in the specification?').
3 See, e.g., Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 904, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801,
1806 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In Liebel-Flarsheim, the Federal Circuit remarked:
We have had many occasions to cite one or both of the twin axioms regarding
the role of the specification in claim construction: On the one hand, claims must
be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part. On the other hand,
it is improper to read a limitation from the specification into the claims.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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provides a simple and normatively desirable conception of claims: Claims "point
out" the invention in the written description.4 This Essay discusses the mechanics
of following the statutory language, and the policy benefits that would result.
Because these benefits are compelling, it is hoped that in Phillips the Federal
Circuit-or, on review, the Supreme Court-focuses on the Patent Act itself in
determining the proper approach to claim construction.
II. THE STATUTORY TEXT
The Patent Act states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the inven-
tion, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The speification shall conclude with one or more claimsparlicularylpointing out
and distincty claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.s
The italicized language traces its lineage back to section 6 of the Patent Act of
1836, which stated:
[B]efore any inventor shall receive a patent for any such new
invention or discovery, he shall deliver a written description of his
invention or discovery, and of the manner and process of making,
constructing, using, and compounding the same, in such full, clear,
and exact terms, avoiding unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any
such person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct, com-
pound, and use the same; and in case of any machine, he shall fully
explain the principle and the several modes in which he has
contemplated the application of that principle or character by which
it may be distinguished from other inventions; and shallpariculary
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention."
(emphasis added)).
' Id. (emphasis added).
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speifi andpoint out thepart, improvement, or combination, which he claims as
his own invention or discovey.
6
As can be seen, both the original and the current statutory text require that the
inventor point out the claimed invention. The current text makes clear that the
claims themselves must do this pointing.
The statutory language indicates that something is being pointed to-that is
to say, that the claims are referential rather than free-standing. The natural object
of this pointing is the written description, which is required by the immediately
preceding sentence in the current statute.' Thus, basic grammar supports viewing
the claims as pointers that refer to the written description. Indeed, Congress
could have stated that claims "define" the invention, or "delimit" the invention,
or used some other term indicating that claims are independent and free-standing.
But by using "pointing out," Congress cast the claims as inherently referen-
tial-and more specifically, referential towards the written description-rather
than free-standing.8
Early claim practice was consistent with this referential conception of claims.
As Ridsdale Ellis stated in his 1949 treatise Patent Claims.
It was the universal practice between the 1836 and 1870 [Patent]
Acts to terminate the description with one, sometimes two and
occasionally more claims. These claims, however, served merely to
call attention to what the inventor considered the salient features of
his invention. The drawings and description were the main thing,
the claims a mere adjunct thereto....
[T]he requirement of the Act of 1836 that an inventor shall
'point out" the part, etc., which he claims as his invention or
discovery seems to have been interpreted as requiring the inventor
to point a finger, so to speak, at the novel parts of the machine
described in the specification and illustrated in the drawings, as one
would in pointing out the salient features of a landscape.
9
6 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (repealed 1870) (emphasis added).
See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
We must rely on the statutory language alone, as, to the author's knowledge, no probative
legislative history exists.
9 RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS §§ 3-4 (1949); see also Karl B. Lutz, Evolution ofthe Claims
of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 134, 141-42 (1938) (discussing how the earliest claims
"point[ed] out the novel features of the invention" and "lean[ed] rather heavily on the [written]
description for their complete understanding").
2005]
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Thus, as Ellis noted, claims often would "point out the novel features ... usling]
the reference characters used in the specification and drawings."'" Claims also
would use referential language, claiming the invention "as herein described" or "as
herein set forth."'
While the statutory text requiring pointing out of the claimed invention
remained, in substance, essentially unchanged between 1836 and the present,
claim practice eventually evolved away from express references to the written
description, and toward the now-prevalent "peripheral" method of claiming.'"
This method treats claims as largely free-standing rather than referential, and uses
claims to "mark[ ] out the periphery or boundary of the area covered by the
claim."' 3 The shift toward peripheral claiming was not required or authorized by
any statutory amendment; as the Supreme Court stated in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co., the "change in claiming practice [toward peripheral
claiming] ... is not of statutory origin.""'
Despite its lack of statutory pedigree, the evolution in claim practice
apparently exerted a gravitational pull on many (though not all) courts, with the
unfortunate result being a schizophrenic body of cases that alternately viewed
claims as referential and as free-standing, and that alternately relied on one or the
other of the conflicting axioms discussed above in Part I-a swinging pendulum
that the Federal Circuit seems resolved to bring to a halt in Phillps.'5 This Essay
sets aside both customary claim practice and the resulting case law, and instead
examines a model of claim construction built on the ultimate authority: the
statutory text, with its requirement that claims point out the invention in the
written description.
10 ELLIS, supra note 9, § 5 (providing examples of claims using reference characters from the
written description, and discussing 1869 Rules of Practice of the Patent Office, which included
model claims using reference characters).
1 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 300 (issued July 29, 1837) (claiming " [t]he application of this endless
belt so as to twist the thread of the woolen roving on its passage from the back rollers to the front
rollers, as before descrbed' (emphasis added)); U.S. Patent No. 400 (issued Sept. 25, 1837) (claiming
"[t]he application of springs as herein described' (emphasis added)); U.S. Patent No. 500 (issued Dec.
1, 1837) (claiming "[t]he form of the bottom of the plow, being made with two plane surfaces,
instead of curved, as is usual, the line forming the angle of these two planes being so situated that
the weight of the earth, when the box is full, will throw the front of the plow up, as herein setfortbi'
(emphasis added)).
12 ELLIS, supra note 9, % 4-8.
13 Id. § 4.
14 520 U.S. 17, 27 n.4, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1876 n.4 (1997).
15 See Phik'ps, 376 F.3d at 1382.
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III. THE MECHANICS OF TREATING CLAIMS AS POINTERS
If claims are pointers aimed at the written description, it follows that the
meaning of a claim can only be determined by following the pointer to the
relevant section or sections of the written description. Thus, the guiding rule of
claim construction under a claims-as-pointers regime would be: A claim's
meaning is determined by reference to the written description to which the claim
points.
This rule necessarily sets the written description as the outer boundary for
literal claim scope. This can be stated as a corollary to the guiding rule set out
above: The literal scope of a claim can be no broader than the written description
to which it points.16
A claims-as-pointers approach would not necessarily limit a claim to preferred
embodiments, as claims could point to the broadest description in the written
description. Many patents contain a general description of the invention that
embraces a range of embodiments, including some not described in detail as
preferred embodiments. Claims could point to these general, broader descrip-
tions of the invention.'7 Where, however, the broadest teaching of a written
description is a single embodiment-that is, where the written description, from
its beginning to its end, describes only one embodiment-a claim could be no
broader than this single embodiment.
Extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony and technical dictionaries, could
play two valuable roles in a claims-as-pointers regime. First, extrinsic evidence
could inform the determination of where a claim points, i.e., the section or
sections of the written description a claim is pointing out. Second, extrinsic
evidence could help explain these sections of the written description. Patents are
technical documents to be read from the ordinary artisan's perspective, and
extrinsic evidence can allow a court to better read the patent through the eyes of
the artisan.
Extrinsic evidence could not, however, provide a competing source of claim
meaning independent from the written description. The only relevant meaning
would be the meaning an ordinary artisan would discern from reading a claim
alongside the written description to which it points. Gone would be the now-
16 The doctrine of equivalents would afford an additional layer of patent scope.
17 At some point, however, a general description loses its descriptive value. Boilerplate language
such as "skilled practitioners will recognize that the invention can be modified in many ways" is
meaningless, and should not carry any weight in determining patent scope. Where to draw the line
between such boilerplate and a meaningful general description is a difficult question, and one which
should be a focus of the courts' claim construction jurisprudence.
2005]
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prevalent contests between meanings derived from extrinsic evidence and
meanings derived from intrinsic evidence.
IV. BENEFITS OF A CLAIMS-AS-POINTERS REGIME
The benefits of the claims-as-pointers approach would be significant, and are
listed below.
A. A CAREFULLY TAILORED PATENT BARGAIN
Treating claims as pointers would carefully tailor the monopoly rights of the
patent, rewarding inventors for described inventions, but otherwise protecting the
public domain. Patent holders would be held to the invention actually described
by the patent, and could not attempt to use a patent's claims to assert rights over
other inventions not disclosed in the patent.18
B. BETTER WRITEN DESCRIPTIONS, FEWER CLAIMS, AND MORE EFFICIENT
PATENT EXAMINATIONS
A claims-as-pointers approach would place a premium on high-quality written
descriptions that comprehensively canvass the scope of an invention. Such
written descriptions would maximize the subject matter to which the claims could
point. High-quality written descriptions also would provide better public notice
as to the scope of the invention, and would better fertilize the relevant field of
technology, more readily allowing other inventors to build on the described
inventions.
A claims-as-pointers system would discourage filing numerous claims (in a
single application or in a series of continuation applications) in an attempt to
parlay linguistic differences among the claims into greater patent scope, as the
scope of any claim would be limited to the outer boundary of the written
description. With better written descriptions and fewer claims, patent examiners
would be able to process applications more efficiently and expeditiously.
C. INCREASED PREDICTABILITY AS TO PATENT SCOPE
If the written description were the outer boundary for claim scope, the range
of possible claim constructions would decrease, and the public would be able to
predict more precisely the scope of the claims and adjust their behavior accord-
18 The structure of the patent bargain is discussed at greater length in Part V.C, infra.
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ingly. The prose style of the written description would enhance this
predictability. 9 Gone would be the confusing etymological inquiry into the
ordinary meaning of a claim and the equally confusing analysis of when the
written description clearly disavows this ordinary meaning.
20
D. LOWER APPELLATE REVERSAL RATE OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS
As noted above, the claims-as-pointers regime would restrict the range of
possible constructions. This would, in turn, narrow the ground for Federal
Circuit disagreement with district court constructions.
E. FEWER WRITTEN DESCRIPTION INVALIDITY ATTACKS
Because no claim could be construed as embracing matter not included in the
written description, written description invalidity attacks would likely plummet
under a claims-as-pointers regime. Indeed, unless the Patent Office were derelict,
and allowed a claim to issue that was wholly unrelated to the written descrip-
tion-such that the claim could not be reasonably read to point to anything in the
written description-it would be highly difficult (if not impossible) to mount a
written description validity attack in a claims-as-pointers regime.
2 1
19 It is perhaps telling that when patents are cited as prior art, the citations are usually to the
written descriptions of the patents, as the prose of the written description provides the best
explanation of the technology. Indeed, in the context of its recent decision on the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel, the Supreme Court highlighted the written description's notice
function, stating:
A patent holder should know what he owns, and the public should know what
he does not. For this reason, the patent laws require inventors to describe their
work in "full, clear, concise, and exact terms," 35 U.S.C. § 112, as part of the
delicate balance the law attempts to maintain between inventors, who rely on the
promise of the law to bring the invention forth, and the public, which should be
encouraged to pursue inventions, creations, and new ideas beyond the inventor's
exclusive rights.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,730-31,62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1705, 1709 (2002).
20 See, e.g., Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 383 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (stating that a court will give a claim term "the full range of its ordinary meaning" as
"determined by reviewing a variety of sources, which may include the claims themselves; dictionaries
and treatises; and the written description, the drawings, and the prosecution history" unless "the
inventor has disavowed or disclaimed scope of coverage, by using words or expressions of manifest
exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope" (internal quotations and
citations otnitted)).
21 For similar reasons, a claims-as-pointers approach might tend to reduce the number of
enablement attacks. Enablement challengers could, however, still argue that the written description
7
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F. MORE EFFICIENT PATENT LITIGATION
The increased determinacy and predictability of patent scope would result in
more efficient adjudication of patent scope. Because patent scope lies at the heart
of patent litigation, this efficiency gain would streamline the disposition of patent
cases at the district courts and on appellate review. The fewer written description
(and perhaps enablement) invalidity attacks would also help streamline the
process. Moreover, with a lower appellate reversal rate, the incentive to
appeal-and thereby to prolong the litigation-would diminish. The end result
would be a reduction in the costs of patent litigation for the courts and the
litigants.
V. ANTICIPATED QUESTIONS
The significant benefits of a claims-as-pointers regime notwithstanding, several
questions about the wisdom of the regime are foreseeable.
A. WOULD THE VALUE OF PATENTS BE UNDULY DIMINISHED?
Answering this important question requires starting from first principles. The
patent system is designed to promote invention.2 Patents are aimed at remedying
a problem inherent in all inventions-namely, that inventions can be copied,
depriving the inventors of the full economic benefit of their innovations. Indeed,
without patent protection, copyists could freely appropriate the fruits of
inventors' labors, chilling future invention. To counter this free-rider problem,
and to ensure a normative level of inventive activity, the patent law provides
inventors with certain monopoly rights over their inventions.23
Against this backdrop, the question of whether a claims-as-pointers regime
would unduly diminish the value of patents is better expressed as: Must the
monopoly rights conveyed by a patent be broader than the patent's written
description, to encourage the normative level of inventive activity? The author
is unaware of any empirical evidence suggesting that the answer is yes-that is,
that prospective inventors need the incentive of an additional layer of monopoly
to which a claim points fails to impart enough information to allow enablement.
22 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power "[tlo promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries').
23 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, ExAnte Versus Ex Post JustifcaionsforIntelkctualProperp, 71 U. CHI.
L. REv. 129, 129 (2004) ("The traditional economic justification for intellectual property is well
known.... [A]bsent intellectual property protection, most would prefer to copy rather than create
new ideas, and inefficiently few new ideas would be created.").
[Vol. 12:501
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rights, beyond the described invention, before they will engage in a normative
level of inventive activity.
Moreover, such an additional layer of patent protection carries with it
economic costs. Patent monopoly rights create the same problems as all
monopolies, i.e., lower supply and higher prices than would occur in a competitive
market. While a certain level of monopoly rights is necessary to counter the free-
rider problem discussed above, these rights should be carefully tailored so that the
costs of the monopoly do not outstrip the benefits. In the absence of evidence
demonstrating that encouraging a normative level of inventive activity requires
extending a patent's monopoly beyond its written description, such extension
should be precluded by law-as it would be under a claims-as-pointers system.
24
Moving from general principles to specific doctrine, three points must be
noted. First, as discussed above, a claims-as-pointers approach would not
necessarily result in patents of narrow scope. To the extent a patent's written
description describes a broad range of embodiments (and not just particular
preferred embodiments), the patent's claims could point to this broad description.
Second, in a claims-as-pointers regime the doctrine of equivalents would continue
to provide the flexibility needed to capture copyists. Third, because the claims-as-
pointers approach would result in claims that are less vulnerable to written
description validity attacks," in this respect the value of patents would be
enhanced. A narrower, valid claim is preferable to a broader, invalid claim.
B. WOULD CLAIMS BE SUPERFLUOUS?
Claims would not be superfluous, for two reasons. First, claims would
provide a mechanism for claiming less than what is disclosed in the written
description. This mechanism is needed in several contexts, including divisional
applications, situations where prior art surfaces during examination and requires
cutting back on the originally intended scope of the patent, and the rare instances
of public dedication.
24 For recent discussion of the problems posed by bad patents, see, for example, Jonathan D.
Putnam & Andrew B. Tepperman, Revisiting the Cost of Bad Patents: For Whom Is "Rational Ignorance"
Rational?, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2004, at 17, 19 ("The issuance of poor quality patents causes
an externality to transacting parties which largely cannot be otherwise internalized."); Thomas J.
Engellenner, Don't S mie Competition, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1, 2004, at 30 ("Unduly broad patents also
cause companies to forgo research and development in the areas that the patent improperly
covers."); Jonathan Krim, PatentingAir or Protecting Propery?, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2003, at El, E4
("[A] growing chorus of corporate and government officials is warning that the U.S. Patent System
is broken, threatening to stunt technological innovation.!).
25 See supra Part IV.E.
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Second, by pointing out the invention in the specification, claims would direct
the reader to the relevant portions of the specification. This could be illuminat-
ing, particularly if it is otherwise unclear where the description of the prior art
ends and the description of the invention begins. Indeed, as discussed above, this
seems to have been the original purpose of claims.
26
C. WOULD PARAGRAPH 6 OF 35 U.S.C. § 112 BE SUPERFLUOUS?
Paragraph 6 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 would be rendered superfluous in one sense,
but not another. Paragraph 6 would be superfluous in the sense that a claims-as-
pointers regime would involve construing all claims to cover the subject matter
the claims pointed to in the written description, plus whatever additional coverage
is afforded by the doctrine of equivalents. This approach would obviate the need
to specify that claims using means-plus-function or step-plus-function language
"shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts
described in the specification and equivalents thereof."2
But paragraph 6 would not be superfluous from a historical perspective. The
event that led Congress to enact paragraph 6 was the Supreme Court's decision
in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, which held a means-plus-function
claim to be exceptionally broad and ambiguous, and therefore invalid.28 By
effectively reversing this holding, the statutory provision had meaning-even if
all it did was recognize that claims written in means-plus-function or step-plus-
function form are unexceptional and simply subject to the normal rules of claim
construction.
If the rule of construction laid out in paragraph 6 were deemed a reference to
the normal approach of claim construction, it would substantially simplify the
paragraph 6 doctrine. For example, no longer would courts need to puzzle over
the statute's reference to "equivalents thereof," attempting to distinguish between
this language and the doctrine of equivalents.29 Instead, the statutory language
26 See ELLIS, supra note 9, 55 3-4.
27 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 (2000). This analysis assumes that the reference in paragraph 6 to
"corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification" embraces the broadest
description in the specification, as opposed to embracing only the preferred embodiments that are
described in detail. Id.; see Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258, 52
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1258, 1264 (Fed. Cit. 1999) ("When multiple embodiments in the specification
correspond to the claimed function, proper application of § 112, 6 generally reads the claim
element to embrace each of those embodiments."). To the extent that the language in paragraph 6
is interpreted to embrace somethingless than the broadest description of the specification, paragraph
6 would require a different methodology of claim construction than the claims-as-pointers approach
as set out in this Essay.
28 329 U.S. 1, 71 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 175 (1946).
- 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6.
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would be understood as simply a reference to the traditional doctrine of
equivalents.3 °
VI. CONCLUSION
The referential conception of claims as pointers directed to the written
description is not new. Indeed, as discussed above in Part II, claim practice
contemporaneous with the 1836 enactment of the "point out" statutory language
was consistent with this referential conception.31 Over the years, customary claim
practice moved away from this referential conception, and apparently took many
courts with it. But not all courts: As a recent Federal Circuit panel noted, a long
line of cases has taken the view that "the patent is an integrated document, with
the claims 'pointing out and distinctly claiming,' the invention described in the
rest of the specification., 32 As this Essay attempts to show, this referential
conception of claims is both required by the statute and normatively desirable,
and in Pbillips the Federal Circuit-or the Supreme Court-would be well served
to declare it the law of the land.
0 At least one commentator, citing certain legislative history, has stated that the statutory
reference to equivalents "was meant to codify the doctrine of equivalents for functional claim
elements." David R. Todd, How Modern Treatment of 35 U.S.C 5 112(6) Has Caused Confusion: Hilton
Davis v. Wamer-Jenkinson and the Right to aJugy on the Issue of Patent Infringement Under the 'Equitable"
Doctrine ofEquivalents, 1996 BYU L. REV. 141, 156 (1996).
31 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
32 Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333,1337,72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1726, 1728-
29 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000)). Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second
Circuit sixty years ago, stated: "As in the case of any other claim, a product claim may, and indeed
must, be read upon the specifications: its terms are no more than a shorthand from the fuller
explanation which the specifications should contain." Musher Found., Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 150
F.2d 885, 888, 66 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1945).
20051
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